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NOT DEAD YET
RICHARD MARCUS*
Over thirty years ago, Jack Friedenthal proclaimed a “crisis” in federal
rulemaking.1 Starting about fifteen years ago, this same crisis attitude began
to crop up from many sources. In 1988, Congress had intervened in the
rulemaking process and made it more open.2 By 1994, Charles Alan Wright
spoke of a “malaise” of the federal rulemaking process and reported that he was
“gloomier about the status of the rulemakng process than [he] had ever been.”3
Professor Mullenix foresaw that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules might
go “the way of the French aristocracy.”4 A few years later, Professor Walker
found “the most serious challenge to the procedural status quo since the
adoption of the original Federal Rules in 1938.”5 Nine years ago, Professor
Bone found that “today the court rulemaking model is under siege.”6
Although the crisis clamor seems fairly universal among academics, there is
some dissonance about the nature of the crisis. Professor Geyh, who worked
with the House Judiciary Committee during part of the period of reported crisis,
© Richard Marcus 2008
* Horace O. Coil (‘57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. This paper was the basis for my remarks at the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) Section of Civil Procedure session during the AALS Annual Meeting in New
York City in January, 2008.
XXxSince 1996, I have served as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
and drew to some extent on this experience in preparing these remarks. But these views are
mine and not presented on behalf of the Advisory Committee or anyone else.
XXxThis piece is significantly based on work that I have published elsewhere. See Richard
L. Marcus, Confessions of a Federal “Bureaucrat”: The Possibilities of Perfecting
Procedural Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103 (2007) [hereinafter Marcus, Confessions];
Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901 (2002) [hereinafter
Marcus, Reform]; Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural
Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993) [hereinafter Marcus, Of Babies].
1. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary
Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 676 (1975).
2. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 100-702, § 407, 102
Stat. 4642, 4652 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2000)); see also infra note
41 and accompanying text.
3. Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG.
1, 9 (1994).
4. Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 802 (1991).
5. Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1997).
6. Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888 (1999).
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wrote that there was “a startling transformation of the judiciary’s role” due to
the more active role of Congress.7 Professor Yeazell saw the problem as
isolation of the rulemakers, who are now mostly judges, from the users of court
services, the lawyers.8
The cause of the crisis also may be debated. Professor Geyh attributed it to
the “Watergate mentality” of the last thirty years,9 while Professor Bone
thought that it resulted from “the rise of procedural skepticism during the
1970s.”10 Professor Burbank noted that certain specific amendments—
particularly the 1983 changes to Rule 11—created a “poisonous environment”
for rulemaking.11 Professor Resnik perceived a pervasive loss of faith in the
whole project of adjudication.12
In sum, the topic on which we were invited to comment—federal
rulemaking—comes surrounded with a great deal of negativity. As one who has
been involved for over a decade in the persisting effort to accomplish things
through federal rulemaking, I come before you with a simple message: it’s not
dead yet. And I think it’s not about to die.
To support that view, I want to make four points. First, the Big Bang of the
1930s was unprecedented, and we will not see its like again. Second, much of
the recent pessimism has resulted from academic dislike of certain constraints
introduced in the last quarter century on the central Liberal Ethos of the 1930s
revolution; and the result is often a case of the quest for the perfect drowning
out the acceptance of the good. Third, the federal rulemaking activity has
important structural advantages that will not go away. Finally, there is
evidence—particularly the recent E-Discovery rulemaking episode—that shows
the federal apparatus is not dead, either as an innovator or as a leader.
I. The Big Bang
We have all been brought up on the notion that the procedural Big Bang
happened in the 1930s with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As Professor Leubsdorf has pointed out in The Myth of Civil
Procedure Reform, we may overestimate the significance of that event in terms
7. Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (1996).
8. Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229,
231 (1998).
9. Geyh, supra note 7, at 1167.
10. Bone, supra note 6, at 891.
11. Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?,
49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 227-28 (1997).
12. See generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
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of changing the practices of courts and the experiences of litigants.13
But it is hard to overstate the applause this Big Bang has received from the
highest echelon of legal academe. Professor Hazard called the Federal Rules
“a major triumph of law reform.”14 Professor Yeazell said that the Federal
Rules “transformed civil litigation [and] . . . reshaped civil procedure,”15 adding
that the Rules were “surely the single most substantial procedural reform in
U.S. history.”16 Professor Shapiro opined that “they have influenced procedural
thinking in every court in this land . . . and indeed have become part of the
consciousness of lawyers, judges, and scholars who worry about and live with
issues of judicial procedure.”17 Professor Resnik found that they even “became
a means of transforming the modes of judging.”18
More than the Field Code managed in the mid-19th century, the Federal
Rules swept the land. Most states adopted procedural codes modeled on the
Federal Rules for their own court systems, often copying them virtually
verbatim and retaining the same numbering.19 The Federal Rules even cast a
long shadow over those states which did not copy their provisions. California,
for example, continues to operate under the Field Code that was originally
adopted in 1872, but the application of those code provisions has shifted with
the tide of the Federal Rules’ times.20 Code pleading in California is probably
13. See John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS
53 (Adrian A. S. Zuckerman ed., 1999).
14. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237 (1989).
15. Yeazell, supra note 8, at 233.
16. Id. at 248.
17. David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1989).
18. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 934 (2000).
19. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986) (examining the
widespread copying of the Federal Rules).
20. Although California remains a code state, its courts have adopted the same sort of
liberal attitude towards the requirements of the code as the federal courts did after 1938 with
regard to the Federal Rules. Thus, for example, we are told that “California’s discovery
system is generally less restrictive than the federal courts.” WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON,
CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 168 (3d ed. 2008). As the Supreme Court of California said
in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court:
The foregoing code sections, although substantially adapted from the federal
rules of discovery, are not copied verbatim therefrom. . . . The importance of
those alterations is that almost without exception they were made for the express
purpose of creating in California a system of discovery procedures less restrictive
than then employed in the federal courts.
15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 98 (Cal. 1961).
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less demanding than current practice in the federal courts.21
At the heart of this Big Bang was an attitude I have labelled the Liberal
Ethos—that suits should be decided on their legal (substantive) merits and that
procedure should be a Handmaid in that process.22 The Handmaid notion was
not a new idea in the 1930s. To the contrary, it lay at the heart of nineteenth
century reform efforts in England.23 But as Professor Subrin has pointed out,
the Federal Rules pursued the central concept more vigorously and further,24
particularly in accomplishing a revolution with the introduction of broad
discovery.25
The combination of relaxed pleading, broad discovery, and deference to jury
trial26 created a procedural arrangement unknown in the rest of the world.
Coupled with dramatic developments in American substantive law after World
War II—particularly in tort law, but also in statutory enactments—the new
21. Thus, in keeping with traditional code attitudes, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a)(1)
(West 2004) requires that a complaint contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause
of action, in ordinary and concise language.” But the California courts do not enforce this fact
pleading provision with the enthusiasm that was common a century ago. In Reichert v.
General Insurance Co., for example, the Supreme Court of California explained:
While orderly procedure demands a reasonable enforcement of the rules of
pleading, the basic principle of the code system in this state is that the
administration of justice shall not be embarrassed by technicalities, strict rules
of construction, or useless forms.
442 P.2d 377, 387 (Cal. 1968). When I was a practicing lawyer in California in the 1970s, it
was widely believed that defendants had more success challenging the sufficiency of
complaints in federal courts than in state court. Certainly the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly shows that the trend is not toward a more
demanding attitude in federal court. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); see infra text accompanying
notes 54-58. For a discussion of the relationship between federal and California pleading
requirements, see DAVID I. LEVINE, WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON & ROCHELLE J. SHAPELL,
CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 137-53 (3d ed. 2008).
22. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439-40 (1986).
23. See Marcus, Of Babies, supra note *, at 780-82 (describing the nineteenth century
reform movement in England).
24. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
25. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998).
26. We must not forget that for most of the mid-twentieth century the Supreme Court
expanded the application of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. See, e.g., Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532 (1970) (holding that there is a right to a jury trial in a
shareholder’s derivative action even though derivative actions were originally creatures of
equity); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) (holding that a district
court may not sequence a trial so that “equitable” issues are tried first when that might
foreclose resolution of those same issues by a jury).
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American procedure produced a litigation juggernaut unknown elsewhere in the
world. In part, this juggernaut responded to a peculiarly American desire for
both comprehensive governmental protections from harm and American
antagonism toward concentrated governmental power.27 Whether or not one
embraces the private attorney general notion, it became ingrained in a
significant proportion of American litigation.
The key point of this familiar terrain for present purposes is that this sort of
thing does not happen often. Indeed, it probably does not happen even twice a
century. So anyone who wants to compare the present to our past is almost
certain to conclude that the present comes up short. And that is a good thing.
Those of us who spent our college years hearing applause for the idea of
“continuous revolution” have (mostly) concluded in our more mature years that
continuous revolution is more likely to be destructive than constructive.
II. Discontents of the Present: Academic Unhappiness with Recent Reform
One reaction to the Big Bang would be that it put in place a new arrangement
that should remain untouched, or at least untouched by rulemakers. Intelligent
and informed observers continued into the 1980s to urge that the best thing to
do would be to leave the Federal Rules alone. 28 Actually, the rulemakers
continued to work on their innovations, and a number of changes were made
during the 1940s. Indeed, when Hickman v. Taylor29 was pending before the
Supreme Court in 1947, the Court also had before it a proposal to amend the
rules to provide for treatment of work product.30 On that occasion, the Court
acted by decision rather than by adopting a rule change.
Maybe it would have worked to leave the Federal Rules unamended and to
rely on judicial interpretation to supply needed details and evolutionary
27. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 15
(2001):
American adversarial legalism, therefore, can be viewed as arising from a
fundamental tension between two powerful elements: first, a political culture (or
set of popular political attitudes) that expects and demands comprehensive
governmental protections from serious harm, injustice, and environmental
dangers—and hence a powerful, activist government—and, second, a set of
governmental structures that reflect mistrust of concentrated power and hence
that limit and fragment political and governmental authority.
28. See Marcus, Of Babies, supra note *, at 761 (reporting views of prominent Manhattan
lawyer that “[t]he worst thing they ever did for civil litigation was to create a standing
committee on the civil rules.”).
29. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
30. See Richard L. Marcus, The Story of Hickman: Preserving Adversarial Incentives
While Embracing Broad Discovery, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 307, 313-15 (Kevin M.
Clermont ed., 2004).
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development. For whatever reason, Chief Justice Warren discharged the Civil
Rules Committee in the mid 1950s,31 and Congress then insisted that there be
a committee established to give continuous study to the rules and recommend
changes.32 The Advisory Committee, re-established in the 1960s, adopted
changes to Rule 23 in 1966 that contributed to a new revolution—the class
action juggernaut.33 Interestingly, in doing so it arguably overstepped the
bounds of its procedure-making authority as those are now conceived, but
delicacy on that front was not prominent in the 1960s. As the 1960s closed, the
discovery rules also received a makeover that removed whatever constraints had
been included in the 1930s.34
By 1970, the rulemaking process had reached the apogee of the Liberal
Ethos. Building on the foundation provided by relaxed pleading (implemented
by the Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson35 in 1957) and the discovery
provisions that were further unleashed by the 1970 amendments and
strengthened by the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the new American procedural
arrangement stood ready to provide—in synergy with innovations in American
substantive law in areas such as products liability, employment discrimination,
and environmental and consumer protections—a true litigation juggernaut. All
of this met with general enthusiasm in the academy.
The American litigation arrangement was not received with enthusiasm in all
quarters, however. One noteworthy quarter is the rest of the world. As
Professor Subrin has noted, with respect to discovery, a common foreign
reaction to American practices is—“Are we nuts?”36 Many countries adopted
blocking statutes to prevent American discovery from being done within their
borders. 37 Although the American system had features that other countries
31. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1006, at 37 (3d ed. 2002) (reporting that “on October 1, 1956, the Court entered
an order discharging the Advisory Committee.”).
32. See id. § 1007, at 37-38 (describing reaction to the discharge of the Advisory
Committee and passage of a statute that required the Judicial Conference to establish a body
to study changes in procedural rules).
33. For discussion of the debates that attended the 1966 adoption of amendments to Rule
23, see John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking, 24
MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 333-45 (2005). For a discussion of the reaction to the Rule 23
amendments in the courts, see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).
34. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747
(1998) [hereinafter Marcus, Discovery Containment] (chronicling the expansion of discovery
to 1970).
35. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
36. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 299 (2002).
37. See Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century:
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found interesting, our jury trial—particularly when coupled with lax American
rules on compensatory and, more pointedly, punitive damages—excited
astonishment. Thus, when the American Law Institute undertook to design
proposed Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, it left out jury trial and broad
discovery, and it consciously rejected relaxed pleading in favor of more
stringent fact pleading.38
On the domestic front, there was a reaction also. I use the word “reaction”
consciously, because the reaction can be described as “reactionary.” That,
indeed, has been the commonplace academic reaction to this reaction. The
domestic reaction was, not surprisingly, prominent among repeat defendants
who felt overburdened by litigation. For any except those convinced that
plaintiffs are, as a group, much more likely to advance legitimate positions than
defendants, this fact should not be too troubling. Others were troubled,
however. Chief Justice Burger and Attorney General Griffin Bell, for example,
were prompted by such “defense” reactions to endorse constraints on
discovery.39
There followed a number of bouts of rule reform—in 1980, 1983, 1993,
2000, 2003, and 2006. These reforms largely involved efforts to constrain or
focus litigation based on experience under the wide-open 1970 version of the
Federal Rules. At least some of the reforms—such as the 1983 amendment to
Rule 11—were quite dubious. But for most, the reaction far outdid the actual
change.
The recurrent tenor of academic commentary—as captured in the opening
paragraphs of this essay—is disapproval. There seem to be at least two strands
to that disapproval. The first might be called process-oriented. Many
emphasize that the process of making procedural change has been “politicized.”
Beyond a doubt, something of that sort has occurred. In the 1960s, the
Reporter was told to keep what he was doing secret until the Advisory
Committee was ready to announce proposed changes.40 By the 1970s, that era
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 153-54 (1999).
38. See AM. LAW INST./INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES
OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
39. See Marcus, Discovery Containment, supra note 34, at 752-55 (describing the 1976
Pound Conference assurances by Chief Justice Burger that revisions of the discovery rules
would be considered, and the role of the Department of Justice, under Attorney General Bell’s
leadership, in developing those changes).
40. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161,
164 (1991):
I have been told by one of my predecessors [as Reporter of the U.S. Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules], the late Al Sacks, that he was
instructed to keep his work entirely under wraps until the committee was
prepared to make a recommendation. This practice reflected, of course, the
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of secrecy was passing, and the 1988 legislation buried it entirely by requiring
that Advisory Committee meetings be open and that there be advance notice of
what would be discussed.41 Beginning in the 1990s, the Advisory Committee
convened conferences to solicit suggestions for rule changes and reactions to
proposed amendments.42 Throughout, opportunities for interested participants
to know what the Committee is considering and to express views has increased.
Besides being what Congress insisted upon, this openness might be seen as
a good thing. Indeed, “accountability” is a favored catch-word nowadays, so
this process would appear to be desirable because it would provide additional
accountability. Yet the process-based critique often seems to regard the
“political” consequences of the shift to increased public access to rulemaking
as bad. Frankly, it is difficult to credit the process-based criticism as a freestanding one. The basic objection is the second one—by and large, academics
don’t like the changes that have been made during the period of openness.
It is beyond doubt that the rule changes that have been made since 1970 have
mainly sought to constrain and contain the genie released by the Federal Rules
and the changes made before 1970. For those who wholeheartedly embrace the
Liberal Ethos, that is a retrograde direction for change. Yet all should
appreciate that even the Liberal Ethos must recognize some limits; if one
appreciates that any change is likely to improve the lot of some and weaken the
position of others in this zero-sum game, that feature matters only for those who
begin with the presumption that some groups—defendants or plaintiffs, for
example—are to be preferred. The rules process does not begin with that
presumption, and continues to resist purely self-interested arguments for
change.43
To my mind, the most striking aspects of the objections to recent rule
changes have been (1) that they often seem to focus on the wrong things, and
(2) that they often misjudge the things on which they do focus.
Often the critics of rule-change packages focus on features that are less
important than others they disregard. For example, in 1993 the proposal to
introduce initial disclosure raised an unprecedented ruckus.44 But by the time
traditions of judicial institutions accustomed to keeping their adjudicative
deliberations to themselves.
Id. at 164.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (2000) (requiring that there be advance notice of meetings,
that meetings be open to the public and that minutes of such meetings be maintained and open
to the public as well).
42. See Marcus, Reform, supra note *, at 917-19 for a discussion of this point.
43. See Carrington, supra note 40, at 165 (noting that self-interested arguments get a deaf
ear).
44. See Marcus, Of Babies, supra note *, at 805-10 (describing the controversy in 1991-93
about initial disclosure).
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it was finally adopted, initial disclosure had been watered down and was subject
to a local opt-out right that permitted individual districts to decide not to adopt
disclosure. Frankly, it was not a big deal, even though it prompted a legislative
effort to rescind the change that came within one vote of success. The big deal
in 1993 was the package of expert disclosure and discovery provisions, which
has had a major impact. Even now the Advisory Committee is studying ways
to deal with, and perhaps to constrain, aspects of that discovery change. But
there was hardly a peep about expert disclosure and discovery provisions
between 1991 and 1993.
Somewhat similarly, between 1998 and 2000 the outcry about the package
of discovery rule amendments focused on the minor revision to the scope
provision of Rule 26(b)(1). As we have recently been told, this change “has
been universally criticized by legal scholars.”45 Outside the academic sphere,
it was also severely attacked. A member of the Standing Committee labeled this
change “revolutionary.”46 Frankly, it seems that this was much ado about
almost nothing. The Committee Note about the change emphasized that it was
a minor revision.47 A sensible reaction would be to say, “This is no big deal.”
Certainly that is what experience has shown. Thus, Professor Rowe, who
argued and voted against the change as a member of the Advisory Committee,
soon found that it had made no demonstrable difference in decisions,48 and
federal judges continue to intone that discovery is extremely wide.49 The big
45. Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a
Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1186 (2005).
46. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, June 18 & 19, 1998, at 23, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/minutes/june1998.pdf:
One of the members expressed strong opposition to the proposed changes,
especially the amendment limiting the scope of attorney-managed discovery, and
he described the amendments as “revolutionary.” He said that they would “throw
out” the present discovery system, which was well understood by the bar and had
worked very well, and replace it with a system that required judges, rather than
lawyers, to make discovery decisions.
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (noting,
“The dividing line between information relevant to the claims and defenses and that relevant
only to the subject matter of the action cannot be defined with precision.”).
48. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the
Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13 (2001).
49. See Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D. Conn. 2005) (“The
definition of relevance continues to be liberally interpreted even after changes to Rule 26 in
2000.”); see also Fisher v. Baltimore Life Ins. Co., 235 F.R.D. 617, 622 (N.D. W. Va. 2006)
(saying that discovery rules are given a broad and liberal treatment); Anton v. Prospect Café
Milano, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 216, 218 (D. D.C. 2006) (saying that the term “relevance” is broadly
construed).
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deal in the 2000 amendments package was its handling of initial disclosure,
which was recalibrated to be limited to information the disclosing party might
use as evidence, and which was made nationally binding. Although that got the
attention of district judges,50 it received very little attention otherwise.
I have several reactions to these reactions to the rule-amendment experience
of recent years. The first is that in this politicized environment almost
everything is poisoned by suspicion; the most mundane of changes provoke
strident over-reactions from those who suspect a malign hidden agenda.
The second reaction is more important: there has been no real retreat from
the core views of the Liberal Ethos. To the contrary, the theme has been to
preserve the basic structure but to constrain it somewhat. Arguably, the
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement of the 1980s could have
introduced a new paradigm of conciliation that might have replaced the
litigation-oriented Liberal Ethos, but it has not. To the contrary, (except for
efforts to undercut class actions with arbitration clauses51) the ADR impulse
has seemed to weaken in the last decade. Perhaps that is, in part, due to second
thoughts among business litigants about the attractions of arbitration. But it
would be hard to say that the ferocity of litigation has disappeared, or even
abated. The judicial management movement, which has come under much
criticism, 52 really looks more like a way to generate some control over the
otherwise unfettered latitude of counsel.53
A third reaction is important as well: rule changes are not the only way that
shifts in direction can occur. Rules are subject to interpretation and
enforcement by courts. The most recent Supreme Court term emphasizes that
such interpretation can change. For our purposes, the most notable decision is
probably Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,54 which appeared to jettison the
statement in Conley v. Gibson55 that “a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”56
In Bell Atlantic, the Court declared that,

50. See Marcus, Reform, supra note *, at 915 (quoting apoplectic objections from judges).
51. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005).
52. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (arguing that
more active judicial management of litigation creates threats to judicial impartiality without
producing gains in efficiency).
53. See Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the American Litigator: The New Role of American
Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 3 (2003).
54. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
55. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
56. Id. at 45-46.
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[A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation
has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.57
In part, the Court said that it felt that being demanding about pleading
requirements was warranted because of the prospect of broad discovery if the
claim was not intercepted before that occurred.58
In a related vein, consider Scott v. Harris,59 holding that summary judgment
should be granted for the defendant in a suit by a motorist severely injured when
police pursuing him rammed his car and caused a single-car accident. The
Court’s ruling was based on a videotape of the police pursuit that persuaded it
that the defendants’ decision to ram plaintiff’s car was reasonable.60 The Court
found the chase was “a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,
placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious
injury.”61 Under these circumstances, the Court ruled, plaintiff’s assertions that
he was in full control of his vehicle did not present a genuine issue, and the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirming the denial of summary judgment for the
defendant was wrong:
When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
That was the case here with regard to the factual issue whether
respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life.
Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the record
that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of
Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction.62
57. 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
58. See id. at 1966-67.
59. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
60. Id. at 1775-76.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1776. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that “[t]his is hardly the stuff of
Hollywood.” Id. at 1783 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He elaborated:
XXRelying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion of a nighttime chase
on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where no pedestrians or other “bystanders”
were present, buttressed by uninformed speculation about the possible
consequences of discontinuing the chase, eight of the jurors on this Court reach
a verdict that differs from the views of the judges on both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on
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Thus, it may be that the Court will further broaden the authority of judges to
intercept weak cases rather then leaving them to jury decision.
In sum, these two decisions underscore the extent to which the actual
operation of rules—while heavily influenced by their content—is hardly entirely
determined by their content. Particularly for those who might have urged that
the Federal Rules not be touched and left to evolve under judicial
interpretation,63 there may be reason for caution. More generally, there is
plenty of room for skepticism about politicized hot-button responses to
relatively minor rule changes that don’t significantly alter the fundamental
Liberal Ethos of the rules.
A final reaction is that the academic response of the present seems almost
entirely conservative, in the sense that it opposes all change as inimical to the
Liberal Ethos. But if leaving the rules unchanged is not a full protection against
such developments (as the Court’s recent decisions suggest it may not be), it
seems odd to use unhappiness with very minor amendments as a ground for
losing faith in the rules process. Besides judicial action, the alternative, it must
be remembered, is legislative action. Perhaps there are those who see the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act64 (PSLRA) and the Class Action
Fairness Act65 (CAFA) as such signal improvements on what the Advisory
Committee has done that they show the Committee’s day has passed. But for
Georgia roads than we are. The Court’s justification for this unprecedented
departure from our well-settled standard of review of factual determinations
made by a district court and affirmed by a court of appeals is based on its
mistaken view that the Court of Appeals’ description of the facts was “blatantly
contradicted by the record” and that respondent’s version of the events was “so
utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed
him.”
XXRather than supporting the conclusion that what we see on the video
“resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,” the tape
actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower court’s appraisal of the
factual questions at issue. More important, it surely does not provide a
principled basis for depriving the respondent of his right to have a jury evaluate
the question whether the police officers’ decision to use deadly force to bring the
chase to an end was reasonable.
Id. at 1781-82.
63. See supra text accompanying note 28.
64. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(revising pleading standards for securities fraud suits and imposing a discovery stay until
plaintiffs have satisfied heightened pleading standards).
65. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
(expanding federal-court jurisdiction to prevent plaintiffs from filing class actions in state
courts that are allegedly unduly receptive to granting class-action status). See also Richard
Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1756 (2008).
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those who don’t see the legislation that way, or who don’t revel in the Court’s
handling of such issues under the current rules, perhaps another look at the
existing rules apparatus is in order. At least the minor disappointments some
rule changes have produced among academics should be balanced against the
prospects of much more aggressive changes that could come from other sources.
The adage that the perfect is the enemy of the good may apply here.
III. Reasons Why the Federal Rules Will Continue to Be Important
Professor Oakley tells us, based on an updated review of state courts’
adoption of the Federal Rules, that “the FRCP have lost credibility as avatars
of procedural reform. Federal procedure is less influential in state courts today
than at any time in the past quarter-century.”66 Professor Koppel assures us
that “[t]he ‘top-down’ federal rules model for achieving inter-state uniformity
has failed.”67 On top of the widespread academic criticism of the Federal
Rules,68 this erosion of the Rules’ following among states may be a further
example of the demise of the entire project.
I don’t think the project is in its death throes. For one thing, as I will explain
below, the Federal Rules have taken the lead on what has been, for the bar, the
most prominent litigation topic of the last decade—E-Discovery. Besides the
E-Discovery experience, I think there are at least three reasons why the Federal
Rules process enjoys advantages that will make it continue to be the biggest
game in town, even if it is not as big a game as it was in the past.
First, the federal courts are a nationwide court system, and there is a federal
court in every state. No other rulemaking body (unless you count Congress)
can control the procedure in courts of more than one state. True, the
Conformity Act,69 and the Process Acts before it, abjured this natural position
of leadership by requiring federal courts to adopt some form of conformity with
state practice.70 But so long as the federal courts retain a basically consistent
procedural system nationwide, there will be a natural tendency for that system
to influence the way the states handle their procedure. As noted above,71 in
California the handling of pleadings under the code pleading statute has evolved
to resemble the federal approach, even to exceed the federal approach in laxity.
66. John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354,
355 (2003).
67. Koppel, supra note 45, at 1173.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
69. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
70. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1035-42 (1982) (describing experience under the Process Acts and the Conformity
Act).
71. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008

312

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:299

In some surprising ways, federal procedure has continued to influence the
California courts. Thus, a recent article in the legal press reported that CAFA72
has affected California state judges: “Although the federal law doesn’t apply in
state courts, legal experts say California Superior Court judges are following
suit and using extra caution before approving coupon settlements.”73
This structural advantage will probably be increasingly reinforced by the
growing nationalization of at least some forms of law practice. Indeed, the
adoption of the Rules Enabling Act74 was opposed in part on the ground that it
would facilitate multistate practices by permitting lawyers from large firms in
big cities to walk confidently into federal courts across the land.75 Certainly
“national” practices today have far eclipsed those of seventy years ago, and this
development has reinforced the prominence of the procedures of the national
court system.
Of course, the states may decline to follow the federal lead. California offers
examples of that. Recently, the California Legislature was asked to adopt a
class action bill that was said to modify California class action practice to
resemble federal practice, and it was rejected.76 Similarly, some time ago
72. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
73. Rebecca Beyer, Coupon-Based Settlements Get Tougher, L.A. DAILY J., May 29, 2007,
at 1.
74. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)).
75. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2009 (1989).
Professor Subrin quotes a West Virginia lawyer who opposed the adoption of the Rules
Enabling Act, in part for the following reasons:
[A] firm in a great city may represent a railroad, or an industrial company doing
business in many states[;] if the procedure in the Federal Courts is uniform this
city firm can, itself, conduct the main parts of the litigation and reduce the local
lawyers substantially to filing clerks and advisors on jurors. Uniformity,
therefore, increases the influence and importance of the great city firm, having
as its head, perhaps, some business man masquerading as a lawyer, with his
partners of first and second magnitude, law clerks, process servers, runners, etc.;
would correspondingly reduce local practice, local ability and local pride and
drive the practice of law further on the downward road from a profession to a
business. . . . Uniformity would further augment the importance of large
aggregations of men and depress the individual.
Id. (citing Letter from Connor Hall to Editor, American Bar Association Journal (Oct. 15,
1926) (on file with Library of Congress, Legislative File 1913-1933)).
76. Assem. B. 1505, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). This bill would have replaced
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1781 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) with a new provision and added
several new sections to the CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE, including § 383 that tracked FED. R. CIV.
P. 23. Gov. Schwarzenegger’s office wrote to the Legislature favoring passage of the bill,
noting that because California’s class action statute dated from 1872 it “has largely been
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California, by judicial decision, chose to follow the Supreme Court’s Celotex77
rule on the showing required of a moving party seeking summary judgment,78
and the Legislature responded to the objections of plaintiffs’ lawyers by
amending the summary judgment statute to require at least seventy-five days
notice of a motion, thus offsetting somewhat the reduced showing.79 But if
anything, these examples underscore the abiding leadership role of federal
procedure.
Second, the federal courts have an institutionalized and highly expert
rulemaking apparatus. The Administrative Office of the Unites States Courts
has a Rules Committee Support Office with a professional staff of long
experience and high expertise. Each of the five Advisory Committees has a
Reporter who has long experience. The Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure provides leadership and direction. Together, these
people have a powerful institutional memory, and increasingly the work product
of this institutional activity is available online for any who want to use it. As
academics, we know that the federal rulemaking experience has been the topic
of many articles. There simply is no similar procedural rulemaking apparatus
elsewhere in this country.
One feature of this apparatus that should be emphasized is that it is
independent and relatively apolitical. True, it may be said to be more
responsive to the judiciary than some would prefer. But the judiciary itself is
an independent branch of government and, despite lobbying, the rulemaking
process has not displayed anything like the sorts of partisan or otherwise
political traits that one would find in Congress or a state legislature.
Third, the federal rulemaking apparatus has access to the Research Division
of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), a unique resource. Access to empirical
information is central to effective rulemaking nowadays. Fifteen years ago,
Professor Burbank called for a moratorium on further federal rulemaking
pending development of an empirical component.80 For a long time, and
shaped through an ad hoc approach by court rulings.” Letter from Brent J. Jarmisch, Deputy
Director of Legislation, Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, to Nancy Parra,
Assemblywoman, California Assembly (May 4, 2007) (on file with author). In contrast, the
bill “builds on the foundation laid in the federal rules.” Id. On May 7, 2007, a committee of
the California Assembly defeated the bill after it was opposed on the ground that it was “anticonsumer.” See Cheryl Miller, Lawmakers Reject New Class Action Rules, RECORDER (S.F.),
May 9, 2007, at 1, 5.
77. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
78. See Union Bank v. L.A. County Super. Ct. (Demetry), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (adopting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317, as the rule for California).
79. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a).
80. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993).
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increasingly, the FJC has supplied the Advisory Committee with detailed and
informative empirical information about the actual functioning of the federal
court system.81 In recent years, the existence of the Case Management/
Electronic Court Filing (CM/ECF) system of electronic recordkeeping for the
federal courts has meant that much of this research can be initiated online for
virtually all federal courts. This facility has enabled the FJC to become even
more precise and comprehensive, and therefore helpful to the Advisory
Committee. Although some states may make similar efforts, and the National
Center for State Courts attempts to develop empirical information, it is unlikely
there will be another resource to compare to the FJC’s abilities any time soon.
IV. A Recent Example—E-Discovery
I said that E-Discovery was the most prominent new issue in American
litigation in the last decade. For many academics, that may seem surprising;
most law professors have not attended closely to this topic. But lawyers have.
Since 2000, there have been about two CLE events per week in this country
about E-Discovery. 82 The sums spent on outside vendors of E-Discovery
services have soared, and estimates have placed the figure for 2007 at $2.8
billion.83 Worries about the costs of this form of discovery and the risk of
sanctions for loss of electronically stored information have fueled a new form
of practice. Some law firms have E-Discovery departments and there is at least
one law firm founded to deal only with E-Discovery issues.84
The federal rulemaking process has taken the lead in dealing with EDiscovery.85 In 1996, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules launched its
Discovery Project, which was designed to survey and address problems with
discovery. This effort led the Committee to convene conferences of lawyers to
discuss discovery issues. The one new topic that emerged from these
conferences was that discovery of electronically stored information was the “big
81. See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002).
82. See Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to EDiscovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11 & n.48 (2004) (describing FJC compilation of
information on E-Discovery CLE events).
83. See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery and Beyond: Toward Brave New World or
1984?, 236 F.R.D. 598, 607 (2006).
84. See, e.g., Janet H. Kwuon & Karen Wan, High Stakes for Missteps in EDD, N.J.L.J.,
Dec. 31, 2007, at E2 (asserting that “it is unclear to what extent e-discovery can be considered
a specialized substantive expertise in the same vein as, for example, patent law”); Jake
Wildman, E-Discovery: Discovering a New Practice, CALIF. LAWYER, July 2008, at 26
(reporting that some firms have established formal E-discovery practice groups) .
85. More detail on the background on the Federal Rules development of a response to EDiscovery maybe found in Marcus, supra note 82, at 2-10.
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new problem” that nobody had noticed yet. As of 1997, when these reports first
began to surface, that was true. The Advisory Committee was not familiar with
the problems, much less solutions, and nothing to deal with this form of
discovery was included in the package of amendments that went forward in
1998.
Beginning in 2000, the Discovery Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee
worked to acquaint itself with the issues raised by E-Discovery and their
possible solutions. The Chair of that Subcommittee and I attended a leadership
meeting of the ABA Section of Litigation and presided over an “open mike”
session concerning E-Discovery issues. Many who buttonholed us during the
meeting urged that rule amendments be adopted to emphasize to clients that
discovery responses had to include electronically stored information. The
Subcommittee enlisted the FJC to do research on the extent and nature of EDiscovery problems. Ken Withers—who had a unique command of these
issues—joined the FJC around this time and contributed to its work. The
Subcommittee also held two conferences to learn from lawyers (including
representatives of lawyer organizations) and “techies” about these issues. The
upshot at that time was that the nature of the problems was not clear, and the
nature of appropriate rule responses was even less clear. Thus, although the
discussion included a list of possible rule changes that might be helpful, no
further action was taken.
Beginning in late 2002, the Committee returned its attention to E-Discovery.
After reviewing responses to a letter inviting comment from lawyers around the
country, the Subcommittee began an arduous drafting effort to try to distill
plausible rule responses to these issues. Again, the FJC provided important
assistance. After extensive review of these amendment ideas, the Committee
convened a major conference on E-Discovery in February 2004 to discuss a
range of issues.86 Drafting on possible amendments began in earnest after that
conference, leading to publication of a preliminary draft of proposed
amendments in August 2004 and very extensive public comment and hearings
through February 2005.87 The summaries of the public comments and hearing
testimony filled about 200 single-spaced pages. Using this input, the
Committee returned to several key areas and revised the proposals that had been
published for comment. The revised amendments were approved by the Judicial
Conference, adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, and went into effect on
December 1, 2006.
86. Transcriptions of most of the proceedings of this conference were published in the
Fordham Law Review. See 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 23-152 (2004).
87. The sign-ups for the final hearing—in Washington, D.C., in February 2005—were so
numerous that an extra half day had to be added to enable the Committee to hear from them
all.
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The point of this tale is that the multi-year federal effort has provided an
unequaled basis for rulemaking. As a result, it has shaped proposed state-court
responses. E-Discovery is not the sole preserve of the federal courts. To the
contrary, it is increasingly true that business and institutional (and much
personal) information is available only from electronic sources. Already,
divorce lawyers are honing in on electronic sources for evidence,88 and personal
injury lawyers are likely to wake up to this source of information soon, not the
least because medical records are increasingly maintained mainly or only in
electronic form. For states, therefore, the same sorts of issues will be
important.89
How then should the states approach those issues? One answer, of course,
would be to follow the federal lead. And that is exactly what has happened in
at least two extremely important efforts to design procedures for state courts to
use in dealing with E-Discovery. First, the Conference of Chief Justices in
2006 promulgated Guidelines for state courts handling E-Discovery issues,
which “should be considered along with the other resources cited in the attached
bibliography including the newly revised provisions on discovery in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”90 The Guidelines themselves repeatedly draw
on federal sources. For example:
Guideline 1B, defining “accessible information” is “drawn [from]
pending Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B).”91
Guideline 2 on the responsibilities of counsel to be informed on EDiscovery issues “is drawn from the Electronic Discovery
Guidelines issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas” and also relies on Federal Rule 26(f).92

88. See, e.g., John Simerman, Lawyers Dig Into FasTrak Data, OAKLAND TRIB., June 5,
2007, at 1 (describing subpoenas for electronic data on use of payment devices for use of
bridges in the San Francisco Bay Area in marital litigation).
89. For example, the Conference of Chief Justices’ Guidelines for E-Discovery, discussed
below in text, include the following observation:
XXxUntil recently, electronic discovery disputes have not been a standard feature
of state court litigation in most jurisdictions. However, because of the near
universal reliance on electronic records both by businesses and individuals, the
frequency with which electronic discovery-related questions arise in state courts
is increasing rapidly, in all manner of cases.
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF J USTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION vi-vii (2006).
90. Id. at vii.
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 2.
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Guideline 3 on agreements by counsel combines the approaches of
the Federal Rule 26(f)(3) and a standard adopted by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware.93
Guideline 4 on an initial discovery hearing “is derived from
Electronic Discovery Guidelines issued by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas.”94
Guideline 6 on form of production is based on Federal Rule 34(b).95
Guideline 7 on allocation of discovery costs is based on the analysis
of a leading federal case.96
Guideline 10 on sanctions “closely tracks” Federal Rule 37(f).97
The foregoing enumeration does not list all the ways in which the Conference
of Chief Justices’ work product builds on or follows the federal lead, but should
suffice to make the point.
In 2007, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) developed draft Uniform Rules Relating to the Discovery of
Electronically Stored Information.98 The Prefatory Note acknowledges that the
Federal Rules are the foundation for these draft Uniform Rules:
[T]his draft mirrors the spirit and direction of the recently adopted
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Drafting
Committee has freely adopted, often verbatim, language from both
the Federal Rules and comments that it deemed valuable. The rules
are modified, where necessary, to accommodate the varying state
procedures and are presented in a form that permits their adoption
as a discrete set of rules applicable to discovery of electronically
stored information.99
The E-Discovery experience depended on and displayed the Federal Rules’
structural advantages. Because the Federal Rules apparatus engages in
continuous study of issues affecting litigation nationwide, it may identify salient
developments sooner than state courts do. Thus, it focused on E-Discovery
more than a decade ago. Because the Federal Rules apparatus includes access
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
Id. at 11.
See NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES RELATING
TO THE DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION (2007).
99. Id. at 2.
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to the FJC, it was able to bring singular expertise to bear on these issues.
Because “cutting edge” procedural problems often emerge in federal court,
various federal courts were innovating to deal with E-Discovery and could lend
that experience to the effort of designing Federal Rule amendments. Because
the Federal Rules amendment process involves public comment from across the
country, it benefitted from reactions from all parts of the country in refining the
ultimate rule amendments. And because those amendments now apply in
federal courts in every state, it makes sense for the states to deal with these new
issues in a similar way. Both the Conference of Chief Justices and the
NCCUSL work product seem to recognize those natural advantages of federal
rulemaking.
V. Conclusion—Not Dead Yet
So the federal rulemaking effort is not dead yet. To the contrary, in the last
decade it has provided key leadership in addressing the most prominent new
litigation issue, E-Discovery. But the era of Big Bangs is probably past, and
that is probably for the best; any who grew up in the Atomic Age should beware
Big Bangs. Perhaps it is time, however, for carping academics to realize that
the basic core of the Liberal Ethos has not been abandoned or undermined, and
also to appreciate that other sources of rules for litigation are not necessarily
more sympathetic to their plaintiff-friendly views. We will not have a Golden
Age of rulemaking again, but we are not entering the Dark Ages either.
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